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Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption
Supporting Access Policy Update
Yinhao Jiang, Willy Susilo, Yi Mu, and Fuchun Guo
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computing and Information
Technology, University of Wollongong, Australia
{yj971,wsusilo,ymu,fuchun}@uow.edu.au
Abstract. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) allows one-to-many encryption with
static access control. In many occasions, the access control policy must be up-
dated and the original encryptor might be required to re-encrypt the message,
which is impractical, since the encryptor might be unavailable. Unfortunately, to
date the work in ABE does not consider this issue yet, and hence this hinders
the adoption of ABE in practice. In this work, we consider how to efficiently up-
date access policies in Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE)
systems without re-encryption. We introduce a new notion of CP-ABE support-
ing access policy update that captures the functionalities of attribute addition and
revocation to access policies. We formalize the security requirements for this no-
tion, and subsequently construct two provably secure CP-ABE schemes support-
ing AND-gate access policy with constant-size ciphertext for user decryption.
The security of our schemes are proved under the Augmented Multi-sequences
of Exponents Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Keywords: Attribute-based encryption, Access policy update, Ciphertext-policy
1 Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) enforces encrypted data to be decrypted with a secure
access control mechanism that the assigned attributes must satisfy the access policies
associated with ciphertext and private keys. ABE has become a promising cryptographic
primitive providing one-to-many encryption. The notion of ABE was put forth by Sahai
and Waters [22] with the original notion called fuzzy IBE, and subsequently followed
by many othere works. In the notion of ABE, there are two variants, namely Ciphertext-
policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) and Key-policy Attribute-based Encryp-
tion (KP-ABE), depending on the location of the access policy. In the former, the access
policy is embedded in the ciphertext, whilst in the latter, the access policy is embedded
in the private keys. We note that KP-ABE is less flexible than CP-ABE because in KP-
ABE, once a users private key is issued the access policy is also determined, which
makes the encryption more difficult as the encryptor needs to compare recipients access
policies to all other users to choose a proper set of attributes for the ciphertext. In a CP-
ABE system, users’ keys are labelled with sets of descriptive attributes and distributed
from a trusted key generation authority. Ciphertexts in the system are assigned specific
access policies stating what attributes are required for its decryption. In such a system,
a ciphertext can be decrypted by a user’s key only if the set of attributes associated with
the user’s key satisfies its access policy.
When using CP-ABE to distribute a message to a specific set of users, the encryptor
simply constructs an access policy such that the receivers can only decrypt the cipher-
text if they have the set of attributes that satisfy the access policy. The encryptor can
just merely encrypt the message with the access policy, and then upload it to the storage
server. The storage server does not need to be trusted by receivers but it functions as a
proxy, which performs the task that is assigned a priori. Unfortunately, to date, there is
no CP-ABE that supports changes of access policies of ciphertexts. We note that this
is a highly desirable feature as situation can change from time to time, and without the
ability to update the access policy, CP-ABE cannot be adopted in practice. Hence, an
efficient update mechanism over access policies of ciphertexts must be enabled.
One may think that the above question can be solved trivially by requesting encryp-
tors to re-encrypt the messages when the access policies are updated. Unfortunately, this
approach is very impractical and unusable, since encryptors may not even be available
during the access policy update. Alternatively, the Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based
Proxy Re-encryption (CP-AB-PRE) system may be employed for access policy update
as showed in Fig. 1. The CP-AB-PRE works as follows. When an access control au-
thority has decided to update access policies of certain range of ciphertexts, he uses
his own private key to generate a re-encryption key for each ciphertext from the old
access policy to a new access policy, and uploads all the re-encryption keys to a proxy
to modify the ciphertext. When the proxy receives the re-encryption key, it first checks
if the attribute set of the owner of the re-encryption key satisfies the access policy of the
ciphertext needed to be re-encrypted. If it does, then it proceeds with the re-encryption.
We note that much effort have been put into developing and enhancing Attribute-based
Proxy Re-encryption (AB-PRE) including CP-AB-PRE, and this solution is powerful
and strong. What AB-PRE provides is an efficient mechanism of re-encryption, to wit
to output the result of decrypting and encrypting to a new access policy without actually
decrypting the ciphertext or knowing the plaintext, which can provide access policy up-
date but with the restriction that the re-encryptor needs to generate valid re-encryption
keys. Nevertheless, when the amount of involved ciphertexts rises, it becomes inefficient
for the update initiator to generate all re-encryption keys and the upload bandwidth may
also be limited, let alone it is unnecessarily that the initiator’s private key should be able
to decrypt all involved ciphertexts which then require some other users whose private
key can decrypt to help re-encrypting. It can be seen that to update access policies for a
large amount of ciphertexts will exceeds the capability of AB-PRE who specializes in
re-encryption.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this work, we aim to equip the notion of Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) with
access policy update. We present the notion of Ciphertext-policy Attribute Based En-
cryption supporting Access Policy Update (CP-ABE-APU). In our setting, the encryp-
tor will produce encrypted data together with components used for access policy update
and send them to a third party, which provides distributed storage servers and functions
as access policy update proxy. This third party does not need to be trusted; it will store
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Fig. 1. An example of user updating access policies of ciphertexts employing PRE
encrypted data for users accessing and execute access policy update algorithm as re-
quested, which does not give it the ability of decrypting any ciphertexts. We present
a new security model to capture these requirements, together with two constructions
supporting AND-gate access policy provably secure under augmented assumptions. In
our CP-ABE-APU constructions, the ciphertext consists of 3 group elements and the
components used for access policy update consist of n− s−1 and t group elements for
attribute addition and revocation, respectively, where in the construction for attribute
addition the AND-gate access policy consists of s attributes in a ciphertext and there
are n attributes in total, and in the construction for attribute revocation the maximum
revocation number for a ciphertext is t (Table 1). The components for access policy
update will only be stored in storage servers, which makes the ciphertext sent to users
for decryption of constant size of 3. We also present the proofs of security of our con-
structions as well as proofs of intractability of augmented assumptions.
Table 1. Comparison between two constructions supporting access policy update
Scheme
Update Attr. Attr. in policy/ Ciphertext Ciphertext
operation universe Max. revocation for user for server
Con. 1 Addition n s 3 n− s+ 2
Con. 2 Revocation n t 3 t+ 3
1.2 Related Work
After the notion of Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) was introduced by Sahai and Wa-
ters [22], Goyal et al. [9] proposed the first KP-ABE system, in which ciphertexts are
associated with attributes, and secret keys are associated with access policies. Later,
Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [2] defined a complementary notion indicated in [22],
i.e. CP-ABE, but it is proven to be secure in generic group models. Cheung and New-
port [6] presented the first CP-ABE construction whose security proof was given in
the standard model, which allows the access policies to be a single AND-gate of at-
tributes with values of positive, negative and wildcards. Goyal et al. [8] constructed a
CP-ABE scheme but with large key size. Waters [25] designed efficient and expressive
CP-ABE systems supporting any monotonic access structure. Attrapadung et al. [1]
proposed an efficient CP-ABE for threshold access policy with constant-size cipher-
texts, which adopted an algorithm Aggregate from [7] for their decryption algorithm.
Later on, Waters [26] proposed the first deterministic finite automata-based functional
encryption system in which access policy can be expressed by arbitrary-size regular
language. Note that there are also some variants of traditional ABE in the literature,
such as [21,20,13,27].
The above schemes are only selectively secure except for [2] being proven in the
generic group model. Lewko et al. [11] introduced the dual system encryption technol-
ogy into the ABE cryptographic setting to convert one of the CP-ABE systems pro-
posed in [25] to achieve fully security with some loss of expressiveness. Later, Lewko
and Waters [12] introduced a new method to capture full security without jeopardiz-
ing the expressiveness by employing the selective proof technique into the dual system
encryption technology.
The proxy re-encryption scheme was first formalized by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss
[3]. With the concept of ABE and PRE combined, Liang et al. [17] proposed the first
CP-AB-PRE scheme based on the CP-ABE scheme [21] supporting non-monotonic
access structures. Then Luo et al. [18] proposed another CP-AB-PRE scheme with
multi-value positive attributes. Aside from this, Seo et al. [23] proposed a CP-AB-PRE
scheme which has constant paring operation latency. Liang et al. constructed CP-AB-
PRE schemes [16,15,14] proven secure in CCA security model.
Recently, Susilo et al. [24] introduced a new notion of recipient-revocable identity-
based broadcast encryption scheme. In their scheme, the encryptor produces and sends
ciphertexts to a proxy for broadcasting, which will also be able to revoke some identities
from the original set of recipients without the knowledge the plaintext.
1.3 Roadmap
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we present some definitions
and background that will be used throughout this paper. In Sec. 3, we briefly review
bilinear groups and complexity assumption that are used in this paper. We present our
CP-ABE scheme that supports attribute addition in Sec. 4, together with its security
analysis. Sec. 5 deals with CP-ABE that supports attribute revocation, as well as its
security analysis. We presented the analysis of the intractability of the hard problem
that is used to analyze our schemes in Sec. 6. The analysis is done in the generic group
model. Finally, we conclude the work in Sec. 7.
2 Definitions
We first give formal definitions for the security of Ciphertext-policy Attribute Based
Encryption supporting Access Policy Update. Then we give background information
on pairings and complexity assumptions.
2.1 Access Structure [6]
Generally speaking, an access structure on attributes is a rule A that returns either 0 or
1 given an attribute set W . We say that W satisfies A iff A answers 1 on W . Access
structures may be Boolean expressions, threshold trees, etc.
In this paper, we focus on access structures that consist of a single AND gate whose
inputs are attributes. This is denoted A =
∧
at∈S at, where S is a subset of the attribute
universe P and every at is an attribute in P . Given an attribute set W , A answers 1 iff
for all at ∈ S, at ∈W . Thus, W satisfies A iff S ⊆W . Since AND-gates are sufficient
in many application scenarios, our approach retains significant potential.
2.2 CP-ABE supporting Access Policy Update Definition
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system supporting attribute addition con-
sists of five algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Update and Decrypt.
Setup(1λ,P). The setup algorithm takes input the attribute universe P as well as the
implicit security parameter. It outputs the public parameters params and a master
secret key msk.
Enc(params, M , A). The encryption algorithm takes in the public parameters params,
the message M , and an access structure A over the universe of attributes. It will
output a ciphertext CT such that only users whose private keys associated with
attribute sets which satisfy the access structure A can decrypt M . We assume that
the ciphertext implicitly contains A.
KeyGen(msk, W ). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master secret msk
and a set of attributes W . It outputs a private key sk associated with W .
Update(params, CT , opt, U). The addition algorithm takes as input the public param-
eters params, a ciphertext CT for an access policy A =
∧
at∈S at, an operation in-
dicator opt = Add or Revoke and a set of attributes U with U ∩S = ∅ if opt = Add





at∈S\U according to opt.
Dec(params, CT , sk). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters
PK, a ciphertext CT for an access structure A, and a private key sk associated
with a set of attributesW . If the attribute setW satisfies the access structure A then
the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and return a message M .
Selective CPA Security Model for CP-ABE supporting Access policy Update. We
now give the security definition for CP-ABE system – Indistinguishability under se-
lective chosen plaintext attacks (IND-sCPA security, for short). This is described by a
security game between a challenger and an adversary for a security parameter λ ∈ N.
The game proceeds as follows:
Init The challenger defines an attribute universe P of size n and gives it to the adver-
sary A. A chooses a challenge access structure A∗ of one attribute set S ⊂ P with
s = |S|, and gives it to the challenger.
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters params
to the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets of
attributes W1, . . . , Wq1 with the restriction that none of these satisfies the access
policy A∗.
Challenge The adversary declares two equal length messages M0 and M1 as well as a
attribute set U∗ with t = |U∗| and U∗ ⊂ S or U∗∩S = ∅ according to “opt” = Add
or “opt”= Revoke respectively. The challenger flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and
encrypts Mβ with A′ =
∧
at∈S\U∗ at for “opt”= Add or A′ =
∧
at∈S∪U∗ at for
“opt”= Revoke, producing CT ∗ = Enc(params,A∗,Mβ). It gives CT ∗ to the
adversary if U∗ = ∅, otherwise CT ′ = Update(params, CT ∗, opt,U∗) .
Phase 2 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets of
attributes Wq1+1, . . . , Wq with the same restriction that none of these satisfies the
access policy A∗.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β′ for β.
The advantage of an adversary in winning this game is defined to be




Definition 1. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system supporting access
policy update is selective chosen-plaintext attack secure if all polynomial time adver-
saries have at most a negligible advantage in this security game.
It is worth noticing that our newly defined security model has two different types of
attackers considered.
1. When U∗ = ∅, the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ is the direct result of encryption
algorithm without any involvement of access policy update algorithm. It can be seen
that this is essentially the property of IND-sCPA security for CP-ABE schemes
that an adversary who does not hold a private key associated with a set of attributes
satisfying the challenge access policy cannot distinguish which submitted message
was encrypted as the challenge ciphertext.
2. When U∗ 6= ∅, the challenge ciphertext CT ′ is the result of updating U∗ from A′ of
the ciphertext of encrypted Mβ . It can be seen that in this situation it prevents the
type of attackers who obtain private keys associated with any attributes satisfying
access policy before update from learning anything about the plaintext.
3 Pairings and Complexity Assumption
Our construction will make use of groups with bilinear maps [5], and two new com-
putational assumptions, that fit into the General Diffie-Hellman Exponent framework
proposed by Boneh, Boyen and Goh [4].
3.1 Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic groups of prime order p. A bilinear map e(·, ·) is a
map G1 ×G2 → GT such that for any generators g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, the
following three conditions hold:
1. Bilinearity e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab.
2. Non-degeneracy e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
3. Computability There exists efficient algorithms to compute all group operations as
well as the bilinear map e(·, ·).
A bilinear map group system is a tuple S = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)), composed of ob-
jects as described above.
In our construction, an arbitrary bilinear map group system is adopted, without any
specific additional property. In particular, it does not require G1 and G2 to be distinct
or equal. Neither does it need an efficient isomorphism from G1 to G2, and vice versa.
3.2 Complexity Assumption
The security of our schemes are reduced to the hardness of a problem, which we called
the augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. The
problems are modified from the (l,m, t)-aMSE-DDH problem defined in [10], of which
the generic complexity is covered by the general Diffie-Hellman exponent theorem due
to Boneh, Boyen and Goh [4], as the problem lies in the scope of their framework.
First we introduce the assumption which our CP-ABE-AA scheme is reduced to.
Let S = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)) be a bilinear map group system. Let g0 be a generator
of G1 and h0 be a generator of G2. Let n, s be two integers. The first (n, s)-augmented
multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman ((n, s)-aMSE-DDHA) problem
related to S is as follows:
Input The vector −→x n = (x1, . . . , xn) defines the coprime polynomials, of which the


















0 , . . . , g
α·γn−s+1
0 , (1.2)






















0 , . . . , h
ω·γs−1
0 , (1.7)
where κ,ω,α, γ are unknown random elements of Zp, element Tb = e(g0, h0)κ·f(γ)∈
GT and a random group element T1−b ∈ GT while b is a fair coin.
Output a bit b′. The problem is correctly solved if the output is b′ = b.
The following statement is a corollary of Theorem A.2 in [4]. It provides an in-
tractability bound in the generic model, but in groups equipped with pairings. We
emphasize on the fact that, whereas the assumption has several parameters, it is non-
interactive, and thus easily falsifiable [19].
Corollary 1 (Generic Security). For any probabilistic algorithm B that makes at most
qG queries to the oracles performing group operations in G1,G2,GT and the bilinear




(qG + 5n+ 3)
2 · d
2p
where d = 2n.
Second, we introduce the assumption for our CP-ABE-AR scheme. Let S = (p, G1,
G2, GT , e(·, ·)) be a bilinear map group system. Let g0 be a generator of G1 and h0 be a
generator of G2. Let n, s be two integers. The second (n, s)-augmented multi-sequence
of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman ((n, s)-aMSE-DDHB) problem related to S is
as follows:
Input The vector −→x n = (x1, . . . , xn) defines the coprime polynomials, of which the


















0 , . . . , g
α·γ2n−s
0 , (2.2)


















0 , . . . , h
ω·γs−1
0 , (2.7)
where κ, ω,α, γ are unknown random elements of Zp, element Tb = e(g0, h0)κ·f(γ)∈
GT and a random group element T1−b ∈ GT while b is a fair coin.
Output a bit b′. The problem is correctly solved if the output is b′ = b.
Corollary 2 (Generic Security). For any probabilistic algorithm B that makes at most
qG queries to the oracles performing group operations in G1,G2,GT and the bilinear




(qG + 5n+ s+ 4)
2 · d
2p
where d = 2(2n− s).
4 CP-ABE Supporting Attribute Addition Construction
In this section, we shall present our ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme
that supports access policy update with operation indicator opt = Add.
Before presenting the description of our scheme, we introduce the adopted algo-
rithm Aggregate of [7] for the decryption process. This algorithm is given for group
elements in GT [7], but it can be seen that it works in any group of prime order.
Aggregate({g
r
γ+xi , xi}1≤i≤n) The algorithm takes in values {g
r
γ+xi , xi}1≤i≤n, where
g
r
γ+xi ∈ G1, r, γ ∈ Zp are unknown and xi’s are pairwise distinct. It outputs the
value Aggregate({g
r





Setup(1λ,P) The PKG chooses a suitable encoding τ sending each attribute in P onto
(different) elements τ(at) = δ ∈ Zp. It also chooses a bilinear group system S =
(p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)). It picks at random two generators g of G1 and h of G2.
Then, the PKG picks at random α, γ ∈ Zp and sets u = gαγ , and v = e(gα, h).
The master secret key is then msk = (g, α, γ) and the public parameters are
params =
(





KeyGen(params,W,msk) Given any subset W ⊂ P of attributes, the PKG picks r ∈









Enc(params,M,A) Given an AND-gate access structure of a set of attributes S ⊂ P




at∈S(γ+τ(at)), E1 = E
γ







The ciphertext sent from its encryptor to the storage server is then CTserver =
(E0, . . . , En−s, C1, CM ) while the part of CT = (E0, C1, CM ) will be accessed
by users for decryption.
Update(params, CT, “add”,U) Given a ciphertextCT with an AND-gate access struc-
ture of attribute set S and a set of attributes U = {at′1, . . . , at′t} with t = |U| and
U ∩ S = ∅, the proxy adds attributes in U to the AND-gate access structure of the
ciphtertext CT as follows.
Let F (x) be the polynomial in x as F (x) =
∏




t−1 + · · ·+ f0.






i . Then new ciphertext is then CT
′ = (E′0, C1,
CM ) with its AND-gate access structure A′ of attribute set S ∪ U .
Dec(params, CT, skW ) Any user with a set of attributes W such that W |= A can use
the private key to decrypt the ciphertext.
First, the user computes e(g, h)κ·α·r as follows. The user computes
Aggregate({g
r
γ+τ(ati) , τ(ati)}ati∈S) = g
r∏
ati∈S1 γ+τ(ati) .
With the output the user then computes e(g, h)κ·α·r = e(g
r∏
ati∈S1 γ+τ(ati) , E0). Af-
ter that, the user computes e(g, h)κ·α = e(C1, h
r−1
γ ) ·e(g, h)κ·α·r. Finally, the user
recovers the message M = CMe(g,h)κ·α .
4.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we are going to prove that our CP-ABE-AA scheme is secure against
selective chosen-ciphertext attack, assuming that the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHA problem is
hard to solve.
Theorem 1. Let λ be an integer. For any adversary A against the IND-sCPA security
of our CP-ABE-AA encryption scheme SAA, for an attribute universe P of size n, and




B (λ) ≥ Adv
IND-sCPA
A,SAA (λ).
Proof. We now give the details of the simulation. From now on, we will denote by WS
the subset W ∩ S.
Init B defines an attribute universe P = {at1, . . . , atn} of cardinal n. A gives B the
challenge access structure A∗ defined by an AND-gate policy
∧
at∈S at where S ⊂ P
of respective cardinal s. Here we assume S = {atn−s+1, . . . , atn}.
Setup The algorithm B defines g := gf(γ)0 , h := h0. B then can compute
– the value u = gαγ = gαγ·f(γ)0 with line (1.2) of its input values, since the exponent
α · γ · f(γ) is a linear combination of {α, α · γ, . . . , α · γn−s+1} and B knows the
coefficients of the exponent polynomial.
– the value v = e(g, h)α = e(gα·f(γ)0 , h0) with line (1.2) and line (1.4).
– elements in {hαγi = hα·γ
i
0 }i=0,...,n with line (1.6).
– The encoding τ is defined as τ(ati) = xi for i = 1, . . . , n. It can be seen that the
encodings of the first n−s elements are the opposite of the roots of f(X), the encodings
of the attributes in S are the opposite of roots of g(X).
Finally, B sends toA the simulated public parameters:
(
u, v, h, {hαγi}i=0,...,n, τ
)
.
Phase 1 The adversary A makes private key queries. To respond to a query on at-
tribute set W ⊂ P , where W 6|= A∗, the algorithm B must produce a tuple of the form(
{g
r





Observe that since W 6|= A∗ all allowed queries must satisfy |WS | < s. B de-
fines the polynomial QWS (X) =
{
1 |WS | = 0
λi ·
∏
at∈WS (X + τ(at)) |WS | > 0
, where λ =(∏
A∈ωS τ(at)
)−1
, and simulates a private key for W as follows:
B picks at random yW in Zp, and defines r := (1 + ωyW γ)QWS (γ). B then com-
putes the elements for skW :











0 . Since an
attribute at ∈W can be in WS or P \S, (γ+ τ(at))|f(γ)QWS (γ). The first factor can
be computed with line (1.3) as its exponent is a polynomial in γ of degree at most n−1,
and the second factor can be computed with line (1.1) as its exponent is a polynomial
in γ of degree at most n− 2.








0 , where the first factor can be computed
from line (1.7) and the second factor can be computed from line (1.4), since QWS (γ)
is a polynomial with independent term 1 by its definition, thus QWS (γ)−1γ is a linear
combination of {1, γ, . . . , γs−2}.
Challenge Once A sends to B the two messages M0 and M1 as well as an update
attribute set U∗, B flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and sets C∗M = T0 ·Mβ . To simulate the rest
of the challenge ciphertext, B implicitly defines the randomness for the encryption as
κ∗ = κ/α, and sets E∗0 = h
κ∗α·g(γ) = h
κ·g(γ)
0 which is given in line (1.5) as well as
E∗1 , . . . , E
∗






line (1.1). B gives A the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ = (E∗0 , E∗1 , . . . , E∗n−s, C∗1 , C∗M ).
Phase 2 After the challenge step A may make other key extraction queries, which are
answered as before.
Guess A outputs a β′. If β′ = β, B outputs 0; otherwise B outputs 1.
Probability Analysis:
Let I = (−→x n, γ, κ, ω, α, Tb, T1−b) be the input of the algorithm B and the adversary
A break our CP-ABE scheme with advantage AdvIND-sCPAA,SAA (λ). Below we analyse the
simulation in two cases.











−κ∗ . As for the C∗M ,
we also note that if b = 0, T0 = e(g0, h0)κf(γ), then C∗M = e(g0, h0)
κf(γ) ·Mβ =
e(gα, h)κ
∗ ·Mβ = vκ
∗ ·Mβ . Therefore, the simulation of B is perfect, and the adversary
A will guess the bit β with its advantage. Hence, if b = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Else, if b = 1 and T0 is uniformly random in GT , C∗M is uniformly random and inde-
pendent in GT , and the value of β is independent from A’s view as well,
Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1] = 1
2
.




B (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAwARA (λ).
Case 2 (U∗ = {at′1, at′2, . . . , at′t} 6= ∅). In this case, we first show that how a challenge
ciphertext should be produced in a real game. Formally, the correct procedures are as
follows.
Let S′ = S \ U∗. The encryption algorithm Enc(params,A′ =
∧
at∈S′ at,Mβ) is
run to get CT ∗. More precisely, it picks a randomness κ′ ∈ Zp and computes,
CT ∗ = (E∗0 , E
∗












The Addition algorithm Add(params, CT ∗,U∗) is run to add the attribute set U∗ to
the access policy of the ciphertext CT ∗. It processes as follows.
Let F ∗(x) be the polynomial in x as F ∗(x) =
∏
at′∈U∗(x + τ(at
′)) = f∗t x
t +
f∗t−1x










Finally, the challenge ciphertext in a real game is produced CT ′ = (E′0
∗
, C∗1 , C
∗
M ).
Now we assume that the randomness κ′ used in producingCT ∗ is defined as κ′ ·α =
κ. The challenge ciphertext CT ′ turns out to be as follows,



















It can be seen that if b = 0, T0 = e(g0, h0)κ·f(γ), the challenge ciphertext in a real
game is exactly the same as the simulated challenge ciphertext. The simulated game
would be a perfect simulation if it can be proved that the setting of κ′ is indistinguish-
able from a real random value from the view of A. It will suffice as κ is random to A.
Thus, if b = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA,SAA (λ).
On the other hand, if b = 1 and T0 is a random element from GT , C∗M is random
and independent from the view of A,
Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1] = 1
2
.




B (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAwARA,SAA (λ).
This completes the proof. 
5 CP-ABE Supporting Attribute Revocation Construction
In this section, we shall present our ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme
that supports access policy update with operation indicator opt = Revoke.
5.1 Description
Setup(1λ,P) The PKG selects a suitable encoding τ sending each attribute in P onto
different elements τ(at) = δ ∈ Zp. It also chooses a bilinear group system S =
(p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)). It picks at random two generators g of G1 and h of G2.
Then, the PKG picks at random α, γ ∈ Zp and sets {ui = gαγ
i}i=1...n, and v =
e(gα, h).
The master secret key is then msk = (g, α, γ) and the public parameters are
params =
(





KeyGen(params,W,msk) Given any subset W ⊂ P of attributes, the PKG picks r ∈









Enc(params,M,A, l) Given an AND-gate access structure of a set of attributes S ⊂
P with s = |S|, a message M ∈ GT and an extra input which is a maximum











The ciphertext sent from its encryptor to the storage server is then CTserver =
(E0, C1, . . . , Ct+1, CM ) while the part of CT = (E0, C1, CM ) will be access by
users for decryption.
Update(params, CT, “revoke”,U) Given a ciphertext CT = (E0, C1, . . . , Ct+1, CM )
for an AND-gate access structure A = ∧at∈Sat, a revocation attribute set U =
{at′1, . . . , at′t} ⊆ S with t ≤ l and the public parameters params, the revocation
update algorithm works as follows.







(x+ τ(at′)) = ftx
t + ft−1x
t−1 + · · ·+ f0.
Compute








, h) =M · vκ·F (γ),













−κ·α·γ·F (γ) = u
−κ·F (γ)
1 .




M ) with new randomness κ · F (γ).
Dec(params, CT, skW ) Any user with a set of attributes W such that W |= A can use
the private key to decrypt the ciphertext.
First, the user computes e(g, h)κ·α·r as follows. The user computes
Aggregate({g
r
γ+τ(ati) , τ(ati)}ati∈S1) = g
r∏
ati∈S1 γ+τ(ati) .
With the output the user computes e(g, h)κ·α·r = e(g
r∏
ati∈S1 γ+τ(ati) , E0). After
that, the user computes e(g, h)κ·α = e(C1, h
r−1
γ ) · e(g, h)κ·α·r. Finally, the user
recovers the message M = CMe(g,h)κ·α .
5.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove that our scheme is secure against selective chosen-ciphertext
attack, assuming that the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem is hard to solve.
Theorem 2. Let λ be an integer. For any adversary A against the IND-sCPA security
of our CP-ABE-AR encryption scheme SAR, for an attribute universe P of size n, and




B (λ) ≥ Adv
IND-sCPA
A,SAR (λ).
We now give the details of the simulation.
Init B defines an attribute universe P = {at1, . . . , atn} of cardinal n. A gives B the
challenge access structure A∗ defined by an AND-gate policy
∧
at∈S at where S ⊂ P
of respective cardinal s. Here we assume S = {atn−s+1, . . . , atn}.
Setup The algorithm B defines g := gf(γ)0 , h := h0. B then can compute




0 with line (2.2) of its input values, since the
exponent α · γi · f(γ) is a linear combination of {g2(γ) · α, . . . , g2(γ) · α · γ2n−s} and
B knows the coefficients of the exponent polynomial.
– the value v = e(g, h)α = e(gα·f(γ)0 , h0) with line (2.2) for g
α·f(γ)
0 and line (2.4) for
h0.
– elements in {hαγi = hα·γ
i
0 }i=0,...,n with line (2.6).
– The encoding τ is defined as τ(ati) = xi for i = 1, . . . , n. It can be seen that the
encodings of the first n−s elements are the opposite of the roots of f(X), the encodings
of the attributes in S are the opposite of roots of g(X).
Finally, B sends toA the simulated public parameters:
(
u, v, h, {hαγi}i=0,...,n, τ
)
.
Phase 1 The adversary A makes private key queries. To respond to a query on at-
tribute set W ⊂ P , where W 6|= A∗, the algorithm B must produce a tuple of the form(
{g
r





Observe that since W 6|= A∗ all allowed queries must satisfy |WS | < s. B de-
fines the polynomial QWS (X) =
{
1 |WS | = 0
λi ·
∏
at∈WS (X + τ(at)) |WS | > 0
, where λ =(∏
A∈ωS τ(at)
)−1
, and simulates a private key for W as follows:
B picks at random yW in Zp, and defines r := (1 + ωyW γ)QWS (γ). B then com-
putes the elements for skW :











0 . Since an
attribute at ∈ W can be in WS or P \ (S), (γ + τ(at))|f(γ)g2(γ)QWS (γ). The first
factor can be computed with line (2.3) as its exponent is a polynomial in γ of degree at
most n − 1, and the second factor can be computed with line (2.1) as its exponent is a
polynomial in γ of degree at most n− 2.








0 , where the first factor can be computed
from line (2.7) and the second factor can be computed from line (2.4), since QWS1 (γ)
is a polynomial with independent term 1 by its definition, thus QWS (γ)−1γ is a linear
combination of {1, γ, . . . , γs−2}.
Challenge OnceA sends toB the two messagesM0 andM1 as well as a attribute set U∗
with t = |U∗| and U∗∩S = ∅ including all attributes needed to be revoked,B flips a coin
β ∈ {0, 1}, and sets C∗M = T0 ·Mβ . To simulate the rest of the ciphertext components,
B sets E∗0 = h
κ·g(γ)






from line (2.1). B gives A the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ = (E∗0 , C∗1 , C∗M ).
Here we observe that
if U∗ = ∅, t = 0 B should output to the adversary CT = Enc(params,A∗, 0,Mβ) =
(E0, C1, CM ) for access structure A∗, of which the challenge ciphertext matches
the form;
if U∗ 6= ∅ B should output CT ′ = Revoke(params,Enc(params,A′, t,Mβ),U∗) =
(E′0, C
′
1, CM ) for access structure A∗, of which the challenge ciphertext matches
the form as well.
Phase 2 After the challenge step A may make other key extraction queries, which are
answered as before.
Guess A outputs a β′. If β′ = β, B outputs 0; otherwise B outputs 1.
Probability Analysis:
Let I = (−→x n, γ, κ, ω, α, Tb, T1−b) be the input of the algorithm B and the adversary
A break our CP-ABE scheme with advantage AdvIND-sCPAA (λ). Below we analyse the
simulation in two cases.












1 . As for the C
∗
M ,
we also note that if b = 0, T0 = e(g0, h0)κf(γ), then C∗M = e(g0, h0)
κf(γ) ·Mβ =
e(gα, h)κ
∗ ·Mβ = vκ
∗ ·Mβ . Therefore, the simulation of B is perfect, and the adversary
A will guess the bit β with its advantage. Hence, if b = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Else, if b = 1 and T0 is uniformly random in GT , C∗M is uniformly random and inde-
pendent in GT , and the value of β is independent from A’s view as well,
Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1] = 1
2
.




B (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAwARA (λ).
Case 2 (U∗ 6= ∅). In this case, we first show how a challenge ciphertext should be
produced in a real game. Formally, the correct procedures are as follows.
Let S′ = U∗ ∪S. The encryption algorithm Enc(params,A′ =
∧
at∈S′ at, t,Mβ) is
run to get CT ∗. More precisely, it picks a randomness κ′ ∈ Zp and computes,
CT ∗ = (E∗0 , C
∗






1 , . . . , u
−κ′
t+1 , CM = v
κ′ ·M).
The revocation algorithm Revoke(params, CT ∗,U∗) is run to revoke the attribute
set U∗ from the access policy of the ciphertext CT ∗. It processes as follows.







(x+ τ(at′)) = ftx
t + ft−1x
t−1 + · · ·+ f0.




i , h) =Mβ · vκ
′·F (γ).
























F (γ) . Then let κ
∗ = κ/α and the challenge ciphertextCT ′ turns out to be as follows,
C ′M =Mβ · v
κ
















It can be seen that if b = 0, T0 = e(g0, h0)κ·f(γ), the challenge ciphertext in a real
game is exactly the same as the simulated challenge ciphertext. The simulated game
would be a perfect simulation if it can be proved that the setting of κ′ is indistinguish-
able from a real random value from the view of A. It will suffice as κ is random to A.
Thus, if b = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA,SAR (λ).
On the other hand, if b = 1 and T0 is a random element from GT , C∗M is random
and independent from the view of A, Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1] = 12 . Thus, we have the
advantage of B in solving the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem in Case 2 is
Adv
(n,s)−aMSEB-DDH
B (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAwARA,SAR (λ).
This completes the proof. .
6 Intractability of (n, s)-aMSE-DDH Assumptions
In this section, we provide the analysis of the intractability of (n, s)-aMSE-DDH prob-
lem. The intractability analysis is based on the analysis in the generic group model in
[7].
6.1 Notations
For simplicity, we scope the problem to bilinear map group systems in the symmetric
case (G1 = G2 = G). Let then S = (p,G,G,GT , e(·, ·)) be a bilinear map group
system. Let g ∈ G be a generator of G, and set gT = e(g, g) ∈ GT . Let s,m be
two positive integers and P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xm]s be two lists containing s m-variate
polynomials over Fp. Thus, P and Q can be written as P = (p1, p2, . . . , ps) and Q =
(q1, q2, . . . , qs), and impose that p1 = q1 = 1. For any function h : Fp → Ω and vector
(x1, ..., xm) ∈ Fmp , the notation h(P (x1, . . . , xm)) stands for (h(p1(x1, . . . , xm)), . . . ,
h(ps(x1, . . . , xm))) ∈ Ωs.
We use a similar notation for the s-tuple Q. Let f ∈ Fp[X1, ..., Xm]. It is said
that f depends on (P,Q), which we denote by f ∈ 〈P,Q〉, when there exists a linear
decomposition f =
∑
1≤i,j≤s ai,j · pi · pj +
∑
1≤i≤s bi · qi, where ai,j , bi ∈ Zp. Let
P , Q be as above and f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xm]. The (P,Q, f)-General Diffie-Hellman
Exponent problems are defined as follows.
Definition 2 ((P, Q, f)-GDHE[4]). Given the tuple






∈ Gs ×GsT ,
compute gf(x1,...,xm).
Definition 3 ((P, Q, f)-GDDHE). Given H(x1, ..., xm) ∈ Gs × GsT as above, and
T ∈ GT , decide whether T = gf(x1,...,xm).
We refer to [4] for a proof that (P,Q, f)-GDHE and (P,Q, f)-GDDHE have generic
security when f 6∈ 〈P,Q〉. We will prove that our construction is secure by first exhibit-
ing the polynomials P , Q and f involved in the security proofs, and then by showing
that f 6∈ 〈P,Q〉.
6.2 (n, s)-aMSE-DDH
In this section, we prove the intractability of distinguishing the two distributions in-
volved in the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHA problem (cf. Corollary 1, Section 3.2). The proof of
the intractability of the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem (cf. Corollary 2, Section 3.2) is
similar to that for Corollary 1, and hence, we omit it.
Proof (Proof of Corollary 1). To wrap up Corollary 1, we need to show that (n, s)-
aMSE-DDHA problem fits in the framework of Theorem A.2 in [4]. As mentioned
above, we consider our problem in the weakest case G1 = G2 = G and pose g0 =
g, h0 = g
β . Our problem can be reformulated as (P,Q, F )-GDDHE where
P =

1, γ, . . . , γn−2,
κ · γ · f(γ),
α, α · γ, . . . , α · γn−s+1,
ω′ · γ, ω · γ2, . . . , ωγn−1,
β, β · γ, . . . , β · γs−2,
βκ · g(γ), βκ · γ · g(γ), . . . , βκ · γn−s · g(γ),
βα, βα · γ, . . . , β · α · γn
βω, βω · γ, . . . , βω · γn,

Q = (1)
F = βκ · f(γ).
We need to prove the independence of F from 〈P,Q〉. By making all possible products
of two polynomials from P which are multiples of βκ, we want to prove that the sum
of any polynomials from the list R below does not lead to F :
R =

βκ · γ ·A(γ)f(γ)
βκ ·B(γ)g(γ)
βκ · γ ·B(γ)g(γ)
...
βκ · γs−2 ·B(γ)g(γ)
where A, B are polynomials in γ.
After simplifying the list R, it can be seen that if F is not independent of 〈P,Q〉




where A, B′ are
polynomials in γ with 0 ≤ degA ≤ s− 2, 0 ≤ degB′ ≤ n+ s− 4.
Thus, we have the following equation:
f(γ) = γ ·A(γ)f(γ) +B′(γ)g(γ)
which can then be re-written into (1−γ ·A(γ))f(γ) = B′(γ)g(γ) where 1−γ ·A(γ) 6=
0, degB1(γ) ≤ n + s − 4. Since f and g are coprime, we must have g(γ)|(1 − γ ·
A(γ)). However, deg (1− γ ·A(γ)) < deg g(γ) will result in 1− γ ·A(γ) = 0, which
contradicts with the fact 1− γ ·A(γ) 6= 0. 
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the problem of access policy update in ABE schemes,
which make the ABE schemes become practical. When an ABE scheme is not equipped
with efficient access policy update, it cannot be used in practice as policy update is an
essential feature in the dynamic environment. We outlined some trivial solutions includ-
ing using AB-PRE system, and also pointed out the difference between access policy
update and ciphertext re-encryption, which showed the importance of a general efficient
access policy update mechanism. We presented notions of ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption supporting attribute addition and revocation, and subsequently pre-
sented two new CP-ABE schemes featured with functionalities of adding and revoking
attributes, respectively. We also proposed a new selective CPA model for CP-ABE with
these new features. Finally, we also proved the security of our schemes. The proposed
schemes are proven secure against selective CPA under the assumptions that the aug-
mented Multi-Sequence of Exponents Decisional Diffie-Hellman (aMSE-DDH) prob-
lems are hard. The intractability of the aMSE-DDH problems is proved in generic
group model within the frame work of General Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem in
[4]. It remains an open problem to obtain a scheme integrated with efficient access pol-
icy update mechanism supporting more expressive access policies which can be proven
secure under a more general computational assumption.
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